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THE UNTHREATENING ALTERNATIVE: 
CHINESE SHIPPING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1567-1842• 
Anthony Reid 
The peaceable, unambitious and supple character of 
the Chinese, and the conviction, on the part of the 
native governments, of their exclusive devotion to 
commercial pursuits, disarm all jealousy, and make 
them welcome guests everywhere. This very naturally 
and very justly gives them an equitable monopoly of 
the carrying trade, from which the ambition of 
Europeans, and the impolitic restraints of their own 
commercial J>Olicy, have excluded them (Crawfurd 
1820 Ill, 185-6). 
For most of the past millennium China was the major trading partner of 
Southeast Asia. In the thirteenth century Marco Polo (1298, 209) 
pointed out that for every shipload of tropical Asian spices that 
arrived in Venice there were a hundred arriving at the Chinese port of 
"Zaiton" (Quanzhou). That advantage was lost during the enormous 
explosion of European demand for spices in the "age of commerce," but as 
late as the 1820s there was still a larger tonnage of Chinese than of 
European shipping in the South China Sea.1 Until the Nanjing Treaty 
of 1842 the bulk of the foreign trade of Vietnam, Siam and Cambodia, 
and a substantial proportion of the remainder, was carried in "Chinese" 
junks - though frequently Southeast Asia-based. 
There was a natural complementarity between the densely 
populated and technically advanced Middle Kingdom and the sparsely 
settled tropical regions to its south. China exported manufactures 
almost exclusively - ceramics, silks, paper, and a great variety of 
metal tools and utensils - "cast iron kettles, bowls, basins ... boxes, fans, 
plenty of needles of a hundred different kinds ... and things of very poor 
quality like those which come to Portugal from Flanders," as Tome 
Pires (1515, 125) put it. In exchange it took from Southeast Asia an 
extraordinary variety of exotic spices, medicines and aromatics (Chang 
1991 lists the 115 import items of a 1618 Chinese catalogue of import 
dues) along with some bulkier goods such as Malayan tin, Indonesian 
pepper, cotton and at times even rice. 
An earlier version of this paper has appeared in Vietnamese Studies (Hanoi) 29, 
New Series vol. 40. no. 4, 1993: 60-90. 
Viraphol (1977, 180) reckoned the tonnage of "Chinese" (both China- and 
Southeast Asia-based) junks in iriter-Asian trade in the 1820s at 85,000 tons, 
whereas the British East India Company, which monopolized British trade with 
China before 1833, never had more than 30,000 tons. 
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'.fa~to,rs explain the continued dominance of the junk trade long 
te9Jinical.superiority of European-rigged ships might have 
to make it obsolete. The first was the understandable 
>°''0.'.:!st1s~1idon of China's rulers towards the heavily armed Europeans. Most 
Asian states tried to keep the Europeans at arms length after 
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) had demonstrated its 
effectiveness in enforcing monopolies, but China had the size and self-
sufficiency to do so successfully. Apart from the minor toehold for 
Portuguese shipping at Macao, it was virtually impossible for 
Europeans to trade directly with China before the Ming lifted their 
ban in 1684. Thereafter European-rigged ships could unload their 
cargoes only under severe disabilities. They could trade only at Canton, 
under t~e contr?l of the formidable Hong merchants, and they faced 
much higher tanffs than Chinese-style junks. 
The seco~d factor was the peaceful record of Chinese shipping in 
Southeast Asia, m contrast to European. After the reign of the Yongle 
Emperor 0402-24) there were no further Chinese naval adventures in 
Southeast Asia. The junks sailing to or from China with government 
approval (the great majority after 1684) were limited in the 
arn:iaments th7y could carry to two cannons and eight rifles, because of 
Chme~e off1crnl fears that they might otherwise engage in piracy 
(Blusse 1986, 106). Even _when Chinese numbers reached dozens of junks 
a~d thousands of men m ports such as Bangkok, Hoi An, Pnompenh, 
Riau and Sulu they presented little threat to the local regime, whereas 
the lesson was not lost of what had happened to indigenous rulers in 
Melaka, Ternate, Jakarta, Makassar or Banten at European hands. 
Hence many Southeast Asian rulers also raised tariffs and other 
obstacles to European shipping which did not apply to Chinese. As 
Savary des Bruslons (1723 I, 1183-84) remarked of Cambodia, "the king 
and people there cannot be relied on in their commerce with Europeans, 
as the Enghsh and Dutch have often experienced; they are 
nevertheless ordinarily quite reliable with the Chinese." 
Because the literature on this branch of Southeast Asia's trade (at 
least i~ European_ l~nguages) is much weaker than that on European and 
Amencan !rad~, 1t ~s often assumed to have been either unimportant or 
somehow an h1stoncal constant, an unchanging relic of an earlier Asian 
era. T_he re~lity appears to be the reverse. The abrupt changes in 
Impenal policy towards foreign commerce caused discontinuities in the 
junk trade which were more marked than those even in the European 
and Indian trade. To understand the development of Southeast Asian 
states, all of which were dependent on trade revenue to a greater or 
lesser degree, it is important to examine these discontinuities. 
In general, foreign maritime trade was not important in the eyes of 
th~ ~hmese court. Trade was tolerated as a by-product of tribute 
rmss10ns from the south, and the standing rule that Chinese should not 
journey abroad on their own account was enforced fitfully. Until the 
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Southern Sung dynasty Southeast Asians and Arabs conducted most of 
the maritime trade, often in the guise of tribute, and Southeast Asia-
based traders continued to play a major role until the end. There were, 
however, two periods of massive Chinese imperial intervention in the 
Nanyang (South Seas): first under Kublai Khan in the 1290s and again 
under the Yongle Emperor in 1402-24. In both cases hundreds of ships 
and tens of thousands of men were sent to Java, and many failed to come 
back. In both cases there were major technical innovations as ships of 
Chinese or hybrid Southeast Asian/Chinese style began to be used, and 
new Sino-Sou th east Asian maritime elites evolved to play the leading 
role in trade in the South China Sea (Reid 1992). In both cases the 
flurry of activity was followed by a retreat into isolationism, so that 
the Chinese marooned in Southeast Asia were left to adapt as best they 
might. 
The beginnings of regular trade 
Although I have argued (Reid 1990) that the Cheng Ho (Zheng He) 
voyages under the Yongle Emperor marked the most appropriate 
beginning of Southeast Asia's" Age of Commerce," they by no means 
initiated any kind of stable private junk trade to the south. On the 
contrary private trade was strictly banned by the early Ming Emperors, 
while the Imperial court itself rapidly lost interest in sending official 
envoys to the south. It is striking that at the time the early Portuguese 
reports give us the first quantifiable survey of Southeast Asian trade, 
around 1510, specifically Chinese junks were a minor factor, and the 
bulk of trade between the Malay World and China was carried by 
Southeast Asian ships owned by merchants whom the Portuguese called 
"Malay," "Javanese" and "Luzon" (Pires 1515, 119-24), though I do not 
doubt that some of these traders had Chinese ancestry. For the 
Portuguese, and for other European observers down to about 1620, the 
term "junk" (derived from Malay and Javanese jong) referred to the 
large ships of the South China Sea whether crewed by Malays, 
Javanese or Chinese. It was only when Southeast Asians abandoned 
these large ships under pressure of European naval warfare in the early 
seventeenth century that the large Asian junks of these waters became 
identified as exclusively "Chinese." 
It was in 1567 that the Chinese junk trade began on an orderly 
basis with approval from the Imperial authorities. A new Ming 
Emperor approved the repeated plea of Fujian authorities that junks be 
allowed to trade legally and thus bring profit to the government. Fifty 
junks a year were initially granted licenses (wen-yin) to trade in 
Southeast Asia. In 1589 the number of junks licensed for the south was 
raised to eighty-eight, in 1592 to 110 and in 1597 to 137. 
For the eighty-eight Chinese ships licensed in the each of the 
three years 1589-91, we know the regional breakdown of ports they 
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f~l!i~~fi?rfthough numerous confusing toponyms are recorded, perhaps 
iSguisln!ie fact that multiple ships were clearing to the same port. 
tj'fie,a\:lditibnallicenses issued in 1589, 1592 and 1597 appear to have 
been' based on the fiction that they were going to different ports. 
Table 1 
Junks licensed from Fujian, 1589-912 
to "Luzon" (Manila) 
oth(!r Philippines 
Brunei 
Maluku 
other "Eastern Seas" 
Total "Eastern Seas" 
to Vietnamese ports 
Champa 
Cambodia 
Siam 
Ligor <Nakhcn Silhammarat) 
Patani 
Pahang 
(Portuguese) Mclaka 
Phuket (Junkccylon) 
Aceh ports 
South Sumatra ports 
West Java ports 
(southern) 13omco ports 
unidcntiffod "wcstC!m ocean" 
Total "Western Ocean" 
16 
18 
2 
1 
7 
44 
8 
3 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
7 
8 
2 
1 
44 
Corroborating information is available particularly for the 
western Java ports, listed as Banten, Sunda and Kelapa in the Chinese 
record. These had been the principal centres for Portuguese pepper-
ships supplying the Chinese market through Macao, but within a few 
decades the large Chinese junks had driven them out of the business 
(Lodewycksz 1598, 105). From Dutch reports it appears that annual 
Chinese fleets to Java remained of a similar size through the first 
three decades of the seventeenth century - about eight junks divided 
between Banten and Jakarta/Batavia, each of five or six hundred 
tonnes ("Verhael" 1597, 25; Coolhaas 1964, 1; Meilink-Roelofsz 1962, 
398; Blusse 1986, 109-15). Thereafter the global crisis, particularly 
severe in China, the collapse of the Ming dynasty (1644), and the 
continued rebellion of the Zheng dynasty in Fujian and Taiwan, kept 
Chinese shipping at a low level until the 1680s. 
For Manila, Chaunu (1960, 148-75) has provided an exceptionally 
detailed record of shipping from 1620 onwards, which would give the 
following ten-year averages for the number of ships arriving from 
China and Formosa: 
2 
Zhang Xie 1618, 131-32; also Chang 1991. 161-63; Innes 1980, 52-53; Chen 
1974, 12. 
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Table 2 
Chinese ship arrivals per year in Manila 
1620-29 
1630-39 
1640-49 
1650-59 
1660-69 
1670-79 
1680-89 
1690-99 
1700-09 
1710-19 
14.8 
31.1 
15.7 
6.7 
6,0 
5,7 
9.4 
16.1 
21.8 
12.3 
Most of the arrivals in the 1650s, 1660s and 1670s were in fact 
ships belonging to the Ming-loyalist Zheng (Koxinga) r~gime base~ in 
Taiwan and Fujian, or else Southeast Asia-based ships. The Qmg 
Imperial government tried to close down forei~n trade al'.?gether and 
even forced the evacuation of the coastal reg10ns of FuJian, so that 
virtually no junks sailed to Southeast Asia with the blessing of the 
authorities. In 1683, however, a Qing admiral conquered Taiwan for the 
Emperor and ended the Zheng rebellion, and the following year the ban 
on trade with Southeast Asia was lifted. The junk trade expanded 
rapidly, with a peak of twenty-se~en ships .reaching Manila in 1686 
and forty-three in 1709. For Batavia the busiest year was 1694 when 
twenty-one junks entered the port (Wills 1991, 63). T~e period b.etween 
1684 and a renewed imperial ban on Southeast Asian trade m 1717 
represented a second boom for the junk trade, thoug~ probably not ~t 
quite the level of the earlier peak in 1590-1630. The figures for Batavia 
(see Table 3) show that Chinese shipping to that port not only 
increased until the imperial ban of 1717, but continued its upward path 
in 1722 after an interruption of only four years, even though the ban 
remained in force until 1727 (Cushman 1978, 141-2). The junk trade to 
Batavia grew steadily until the 1740 massacre of Chinese in .that city. 
This period also coincides with that of the most effect~ve VOC 
monopolies or quasi-monopolies of cloves, nutmeg, pepper, cinnamon, 
Indian cloth and a number of other crucial items, however, so that 
Chinese trade was undoubtedly more concentrated on Batavia in this 
period than it was in any port in the earlier period. 
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Table 3 
i'.•Chine'se ships• aimtially arriving in Batavia (Blusse 1986, 120-3) 
1671-80 
1681-90 
1691-1700 
1701-10 
1711-20 
1721-30 
1731-40 
1741-50 
1751-60 
1761-70 
1771-80 
1781-90 
1791-1800 
3.0 
9.7 
11.5 
11.0 
13.6 
16.4 
17.7 
10.9 
9.1 
7.4 
5.1 
9.3 
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The Tosen trade to Nagasaki 
Fortunately we are not wholly reliant on European sources in our 
attempts to estimate the dimensions of the Chinese junk trade in 
Southeast Asia. After the closure (sakoku) of Japan in the 1630s, 
Japanese were forbidden to travel overseas on pain of death, and 
foreign commerce was strictly limited to Nagasaki where only the 
VOC and Chinese junks were permitted to trade. A triangular form of 
trade developed, with Chinese vessels, often based in Southeast Asian 
ports, travelling between one or more Southeast asian ports, one or more 
Chinese ports, and Nagasaki. 
The captain of each Chinese vessel (T8sen) arriving in Nagasaki 
was interviewed by Chinese interpreters, and a report on each vessel 
(T8sen-fusetsugaki) was duly filed. This process began in 1644, but a 
consistent pattern of reporting on the junks dates only from 1674. From 
then until 1724 there is a remarkable series of documents preserved in a 
collection known as the Kai-hentai. Although they have been used by 
a number of scholars, few Southeast Asianists have been able to make 
use of them because of the difficult Japanese in which they are written. 
Professor Yoneo Ishii of Sophia University has now undertaken a 
translation of all these documents for ships arriving from Siam, 
Cambodia, and the Malay world. What follows is entirely indebted to 
his expertise and generosity.3 
Prior to 1684 it was factors on the Chinese side which limited the 
trade to Nagasaki. After the Qing (Manchu) dynasty established 
control of the capital in 1644, it fought a long battle against the 
freebooter Zheng Chenggong forces in Fujian and Taiwan, before Taiwan 
was finally reconquered in 1684. The result was that on average only 
3 This translation will be published as a Data Paper of lhe Economic History of 
Southeast Asia Project at the ANU. Sec also Professor Ishii's summary of the 
documents relating to Siam in Ishii 1988, 5-7, 12-15. My attempts to aggregate 
the Kai-H entai data are further indebted to the labours of Tan Lay-chcng and Wu 
Yiqi, to whom many thanks. 
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thirty-eight "Chinese" junks a year (p.a.) visited Nagasaki in the 
period 1655-61, falling further to twenty-~our p.a. in 1662-7_2 a~d 
fourteen p.a. during the final offensive agamst the Zheng regime. m 
1673-84 (Innes 1980, 174-5). Among these junks an exceptionally high 
proportion came from Southeast Asian ports -41 percent for t~1~ whole 
period 1674-84, and half in the yea.rs 1679-84 -_thereby av?idmg the 
fighting and restrictions of the Ch.ma coast (lshn forthco:nmg). After 
Chinese restrictions on trade were hfted m 1684, a flood of 1unks set out 
from southern and eastern China for J\:agasaki, and junks reporting in 
from Southeast Asia never again represented more than one-fifth of the 
total. The totals arriving from different Southeast Asian ports are 
given below by decade. 
Table 4 
Chinese junks arriving Nagasaki from Southeast Asian ports4 
Decade Tongking Cochin- Cambodi Siam Patani 
13ant£?n Dutch Total 
China 
' 
ports 
1651-60 15 40 37 28 20 2 143 
1661-70 6 43 24 26 9 14 122 
1671-80 8 41 io 26 9 38 i33 
1681-90 12 25 9 3i 9 23 110 
1691- 6 29 23 19 7 18 i03 
1700 11 2 0 2 3i 1701-10 3 12 
1711-19 2 s 4 0 0 1 13 
1720-24 0 4 2 0 0 0 7 
52 i99 106 147 56 98 662 Total 
Unfortunately the size of the vessels and their cargoes were not 
recorded in these T8sen documents. The Batavia shipping lists are a 
better guide to these matters, and show that 80 percent of the junks 
arriving in Batavia from China between 1685 and 1715 were between 
150 and 200 tons (Blussc 1986, 123). One Batavia junk measured by the 
Japanese was ninety-six feet (10 m) long and _18.8 feet wide (~bid., 108). 
It is probably safe to assume the junks trading to Na?as~ki from the 
Archipelago and Siam were of similar dimensions, as md1cate~ by the 
crew numbers in Table 5 (which would suggest around 200 tons 1f we can 
accept Crawfurd's formula of forty men for 100 tons), and small~r junks 
ran from Cambodia and the Vietnamese ports. One of the captams who 
had made the trip from Cambodia to Nagasaki m~de the point th~t 
Cambodia-based junks "are mostly of small construction and are n?t big 
enough to load cargoes for Japan" (Ship 26 of 1695). Such iunks 
presumably concentrated on the coastal trade to south China, leaving it 
4 This table is derived from combining Li Tana's (1992) and Yoneo lshii's readings 
of figures compiled by Iwao Seiichi. During this. period there :vere ~wo 
Vietnamese states known to foreigners as Tongk1ng and Coch1n-Chma, 
respectively the Trinh-ruled Red River Delta and the Nguyen-ruled central coast 
of today's Vietnam. 
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to the bigger junks based in South China or Siam to collect Cambodian 
deerskins for Japan. 
. Another series of reports from Nagasaki, the Toban Kamatsucho, 
did record cargoes, but only five such reports on junks from Siam have 
survived, covering the years 1711-12 (Ishii 1988, 6), and these are not 
~vailable to me. We know in general terms, however, that Japan 
imported large quantities of deerskins from the forests of Siam and 
Cambodia, sugar from Siam and Java and silk from Vietnam (and 
China), exporting in exchange primarily metals. 
. Th~ Tose~ documents do provide details of the voyages of the 
!unks ar:1vmg m Nagasaki, and of their complement of crew. This 
mformahon, summarized in Table 5, is of considerable interest. The 
c:ew of all vessels were simply listed as Chinese (Tojin) except when 
Siamese or Khmer were specifically mentioned. The fact that most of 
the vessels arriving from Ayutthaya were based there, with crews who 
ma:y not have seen China for a long time if at all, appears only 
md1:ectly from the ~ata. Only the vessels from Ayutthaya regularly 
earned a small mmo_nty of md1genous crew-members, ranging from one 
to a maximum of nme, who probably represented the interests of the 
Thai royal or aristocratic owners of the vessels in question. Three 
vessels from Cambodia were also reported as each carrying one 
indigenous Khmer. 
Table 5 
Tosen voyages from Siam, Patani and Cambodia 
Ayutlhay Sonflkhla 
• 
Patani Cambodia Mclakil Balavia 
No, reported 64 & ~1gor 59 34 44 of which royd 21 
Ave.crew 87 54 59 56 35 55 of which native 2.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Ave. days to 54 58 47 45 31 85 
Nagasaki 
Range 18-98 28-77 28-73 24-112 50-117 40-196 
% uncompleted in 8 7 year 
% reporting 36 28 50 41 25 28 damage or 
jettisoning cargo 
Shipwrecks 
reported 
% home port in: 
Lower Yang-tze 5 33 22 24 16 (Ningbo) 
Fujian 3 17 11 43 13 16 Guangdong 2 6 17 6 13 Taiwan 3 6 SE Asia iJ~ns Patani 6% Siam 9% Mel aka Batavia 39% 39% Tongking 23 
5 
This fi?ure i~ inferred, where the junk appears to have travelled directly to and 
from Siam with.no ment~on of visiting a Chinese port. Inc.es (1980, 176) points 
out that after Kmg Nara1 restored relations with Japan in 1661. "almost all the 
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The picture given by John Crawfurd (1820 III, 177) and repeated by 
Hsieh Chao-chih (cited Blusse 1986, 108-09) was that despite the 
unwieldiness of the ships and the poor navigation skills of their crews 
there were relatively few mishaps in the junks because they did not 
attempt to tack against the wind or sail at unseasonable times, but 
simply sailed a straight course before the reliable monsoon winds. The 
vessels did indeed obey the rhythm of the monsoons absolutely, always 
travelling north in the fourth, fifth or sixth Chinese month (June or 
July), south from China in the twelfth or first month (January or 
February), and south from Japan a little earlier than that. 
Nevertheless a very high accident rate is recorded in these figures. 
Cargo was frequently thrown overboard to avoid foundering, ships were 
dismasted or holed, and the sense of having "nearly sunk" is conveyed 
in many of the documents. The total shipwrecks emerge only piecemeal 
through the reports of other masters. In addition to the nine wrecks 
itemized in the table as ships coming from a particular Southeast 
Asian port, there were six further reports or rumours of wrecks. The 
commonest scene of disaster was the south China coast (six reports), 
followed by the Japanese islands off Nagasaki (three) and the 
Champa COi'St of southern Indochina (one). 
The ships from Ayutthaya (the Siamese capital) most often 
appear to have made a simple voyage to Nagasaki and back, with 
numerous cases of ships and captains making repeated trips in 
successive years. Of the forty-two captains who reported on the subject, 
thirty-one had previously visited Nagasaki. Only a small minority 
(one in eight) of the ships from Ayutthaya reported stopping on the 
China coast on their way to Nagasaki. Since these were larger ships, 
typically owned and based in Siam, they probably left the 
Chaophraya River already with a full cargo and had no reason to stop. 
The picture is .more complicated at the smaller ports, where 
captains might sometimes call on a speculative basis. The traffic from 
Cambodia typically went in a triangular fashion, from a south China 
port to Cambodia to Nagasaki and back to China. A slightly larger 
proportion of ships than the Siamese, one in six, also reported stopping 
at a Chinese port (Putaoshang or Ningbo) for a week or two on the 
outward voyage to Nagasaki. One captain (ship 52 of 1689) reported 
that his ship had visited Nagasaki the previous year from Cochin-
China (the southern Vietnamese state) and then "returned" to Fuzhou. 
From there he had set out for Cambodia in the second month, but 
discovered (presumably in Hoi An, the Cochin-China port near modern 
Danang) that Cambodia was in turmoil. He therefore left his junk in 
Chinese junks plying the waters between Nagasaki and Ayudhya belonged 10 the 
Siamese king, members of the royal family, high officials, or especially 
authorized merchants" in Ayutthaya. The Siamese royal ships alone constituted 
54 percent of those listed after 1690. 
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Hoi An and hired a smaller craft to take his cargo up the Mekong to 
Cambodia and cany the Cambodian produce back to Hoi An, whence he 
left for Nagasaki in the seventh month. Another ship (83 of 1697) set 
out from Amoy in early 1694 for Cambodia and used it as a base for 
three years, trading to other Southeast Asian countries and 
accumulating a return cargo with which it sailed to Nagasaki on the 
fifth month (June) of 1697. 
Ships from the Peninsula ports, which did not provide the Japanese 
import requirements which deerskins and sugar represented in Siam and 
Cambodia, were still more interested in stopping at Chinese ports. 
Those reporting from Dutch Melaka were openly using the quota 
provided for Melaka in Japan to cany Chinese silks to Nagasaki. They 
invariably carried Malayan tin and pepper to China (usually 
Guangdong) and there loaded Chinese silks for Japan. Two thirds of the 
ships from Patani and Songkhla, and all those from Melaka, reported 
call.ing at Ningbo, Putaoshang, Lu-wan, Amoy or Zhoushang, for 
penods of between one and four weeks, or in one case for ten months. 
Ship 115 of 1687. was based in Amoy. Its captain had visited Nagasaki 
fifteen years earher on the run from Amoy, but on this occasion decided 
to sail to Patani because he believed there was little competition on 
the Pata~i-Nagasaki route. The ship left Amoy on the 26th day of the 
first Chmese month, 1687, and arrived in Patani twenty-eight days 
later. 
Howev:r we found little produce there and were 
wondering what to do when a ship from Cambodia 
entered Patani on the 28th day of the third month with 
Cambodia!' dee_rskin, lacquer and so forth, which we 
bought. With this cargo supplemented by some Patani 
products such as cowhide, Patani deerskin, sugar, 
honey, camphor and aloes wood we left Patani on the 
eighth day of the sixth month. 
They reached the Guangdong coast at Peiliaoyu twenty-eight days 
later, paused for five days to collect water and firewood, then sailed 
for thirteen days towards Nagasaki. Just off Tsushima they 
encountered a strong southeast wind which caused them to jettison their 
deck cargo and their only gun. Having survived this storm, they were 
taken in custody by the Japanese coastguard and conducted to Nagasaki. 
The Tosen documents after 1688 are full of the problems created for 
the Chinese traders by the increasingly tight Japanese restrictions on 
them. In 1685 the Bakufu had imposed a quota of imports of 300,000 
taels. for the Dutch and 600,000 for the Chinese, which was only a 
fract10n of the cargoes carried to Nagasaki by hopeful shippers excited 
to be released from the Chinese bans on trade. In 1688 the flow of junks 
to Nagasaki (chiefly carrying silk directly from China) reached an 
all-time peak of 192 vessels. Japanese authorities, already concerned to 
prevent an outflow of precious metals, were provoked by this disorderly 
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rush to take even sterner measures. A strict quota of seventy Chinese 
vessels a year were allowed into Nagasaki, ten of them from Southeast 
Asia (Tongking 1, Cochin-China 3, Cambodia 1, Siam 2, Patani 1, 
Batavia 2). Southeast Asian junks were also limited to a maximum 
import value of 200 kanme (20,000 taels) per junk, less than the silk-
bearing junks from China. In 1708 the annual quota of junks was reduced 
to fifty-nine and in 1715 to thirty, of which only five from Southeast 
Asia (Innes 1980, 322-53). As Wills (1991, 76) puts it, the eighteenth 
century saw "a steady decline and marginalization of the Chinese 
commercial connection with Japan." 
A difficult period, 1690-1750 
Despite the freeing of Chinese trade after 1684 and the rise of Amoy 
(Xiamen) to a dominant position in Chinese coastal and overseas 
shipping (Ng 1983), the junk trade in Southeast Asia remained at 
relatively modest levels during the following half-century. The period 
(1690-1740) which Blusse (1986, 121-37) identifies as "the heyday of 
the junk trade" must not be understood as applying to Southeast Asia as 
a whole, but basically to Batavia. As mentioned, this was the period 
when Archipelago produce was most nearly monopolized by the VOC, 
so that there were few cargoes to be found at independent ports. It was a 
period of sharp decline in the Japan branch of trade, while the reign of 
Petracha (1688-1701) represented the absolute doldrums for the major 
Chinese base in independent Southeast Asia, at Siam. The Kangxi 
Emperor did not help matters by returning to a policy of banning private 
trade to the south in 1717, out of alarm that Chinese rice and ships 
were being sold abroad. This ban was only gradually lifted after 1727, 
primarily on the new grounds that rice could be imported from Siam 
(and to a lesser extent Luzon), which was a vital supplement to the diet 
of coastal Fujian (Viraphol 1977, 55-57; Ng 1991, 378-79; Suebsaeng 
1971, 262). By the 1740s the fleet of Chinese junks annually trading to 
Southeast Asia had climbed back to 110 (Viraphol 1977, 72; cf. Ng 1991, 
381), roughly the same level as during the peak of the "age of 
commerce" in 1590-1620. 
While the trade associated with tribute missions was only one 
aspect of relations between China and Southeast Asia, its intensity is 
one index of the strength of official relations between the two regions. 
Even during the periods of official bans on private trade, Southeast 
Asian states, using locally-owned Chinese junks, were able to conduct a 
substantial trade. The Siamese missions, for example, were officially 
permitted to take three junks laden with trade goods on each of their 
missions, and they sometimes took a chance on exceeding regulations by 
sending four ships or even sending two tribute missions in the one year 
(Suebsaeng 1971, 257). It is therefore significant that the whole period 
between 1460 and 1760 was something of a trough in tribute relations 
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between the two great peaks in the periods 1370-1430 and 1760-1820 
(see Graph 1). A particularly sustained trough occurred between 1670 
and 1750, when Siam - the most assiduous sender of tribute by sea -
managed to send on average only one mission every seven years, as 
opposed to nearly one every year during the peak periods (Suebsaeng 
1971, 105-123). This trend, combined with the cessation of tribute 
missions from the Archipelago after the arrival of the Spanish and 
Dutch, would have suggested that the aspect of the junk trade linked to 
tribute missions was on its way to extinction. 
The boom years, 1760-1840 
As Graphs 1 and 2 show, there was in fact an extraordinary leap in the 
sending of tribute missions to China after 1780, which lasted until 
1850.6 Not only did Siam send nearly one mission by sea every year in 
the 1790s and early 1800s, but Vietnam, Laos and Burma increased the 
tempo of their missions by land to a level not seen for centuries. This 
phenomenon needs fuller examination.7 Undoubtedly one factor was the 
economic opportunity these missions offered at a time of global 
population increase and trade expansion. As Crawfurd (1828, 409) 
pointed out, "under pretext of it [tribute] the Siamese court is enabled 
every year to send two large junks of ... between 900 and 1000 tons each, to 
Canton, which, at the expense of a few trifling presents, are exempted 
from the payment of all duties." Another factor was probably the 
increasing anxiety of independent Southeast Asian states about the 
dangers of encouraging the major commercial alternative - frequent 
visits by armed European ships. 
A surprising feature of these graphs is the reappearance of the 
Archipelago after a gap of two centuries, in the form of the Sulu 
sultanate renewing its fifteenth-century links with the Middle 
Kingdom. This is a particularly striking demonstration of a broader but 
little-studied phenomenon in Southeast Asian trade in the mid-
seventeenth century. The erosion of the effectiveness of the VOC's 
control of Archipelago trade, the growth of population and prosperity 
in China during a period of remarkable peace there, and the increasing 
vigour of East-West trade in various forms, created new opportunities 
for trade-based states in Southeast Asia to build a symbiotic 
relationship with Chinese shippers. Sulu had been among the ports 
which profited from the freeing of Chinese trade in 1684, but regular 
6 
7 
The data for Siam is taken from Suebsang 1971, while for the other countries I 
am indebted to Li Tana's assistance in reading the Qing Shi Lu. 
I hope that a project which I am coordinating for the Toyota Foundation on "The 
last stand of autonomous states in eastern Asia" will help to resolve this and 
other mysteries. 
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Graph 1: Tribute missions per 30-year period, from Siam to China from 
Sucbsang Promboon 1971. 
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countries, 1730-1870 (numbers per decade) 
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annual visits of junks seem to have begun in the 1720s, while by the 
1750s there were on average two junks from Amoy every year. Sulu 
became a major regional base for the collection of sea-slugs (tripang), 
pearls, tortoise shell and other marine produce for shipment to China. 
In 1725 some of the enterprising Chinese captains engaged in this trade 
began overtures for formal tributary relations, which led in 1726 to the 
first formal tribute mission to Beijing. Further missions followed in 
1728, 1733, 1742, 1746, 1753, 1754 and 1763, each sending pearls, birds' 
nests and other delicacies to the Imperial court. These missions 
represented for the sultans of Sulu both opportunities for trade more 
profitable than those in the ordinary annual voyages, and some degree 
of moral protection against Spanish, Dutch and English attempts to 
establish control of the Sulu Archipelago (Warren 1981, 5-9; Majul 
1973, 249-55, 347-52; Ng 1991, 391-93). 
Riau was another beneficiary of the rising numbers of Chinese junks 
annually travelling to the south in the 1750s and '60s, though its 
location made it more vulnerable than Sulu to political and military 
threats from Dutch, Bugis and Minangkabau. In Cochin-China the 
period around 1750, just before the chaos wrought by the Tayson 
rebellion, was a peak for the junk trade, with fifty to seventy vessels a 
year visiting the port of Hoi An (Faifo) (Li Tana 1992, 95, 98; Chen 
Chingho 1974, 26). 
The major centre in Southeast Asia for the junk trade, however, was 
Siam. As we have seen Ayutthaya had been the Southeast Asian court 
most interested in tribute missions, and one of the ports most reliant on 
Chinese-manned shipping. This great city fell to the Burmese in 1767 
and was almost totally destroyed. Siamese fortunes were restored by 
the efforts of Phya Tak, son of a Teochiu immigrant father and a Thai 
mother, who had been brought up in the household of a Thai nobleman 
and spoke fluent Thai and Chinese as well as some Malay and 
Vietnamese. He fled the Burmese advance to the southeast, where 
Teochiu immigrants were principally concentrated, rallied support to 
drive the Burmese out, and founded a new capital lower down the 
Chaophraya at Thonburi. During his reign, and that of his equally 
half-Chinese successor and son-in-law, Rama I, at Bangkok (1782-
1809), Chinese shippers, shipbuilders and traders were particularly 
encouraged to locate themselves on the Chaophraya. Bangkok rose 
rapidly to become the busiest port between Calcutta and Canton, and 
the new prosperity of Siam was built on an exceptionally harmonious 
Sino-Thai relationship. 
The dimensions of the junk trade at its height in the first two 
decades of the nineteenth century will probably never be known with 
precision. Our best guide to the subject is John Crawfurd, who took 
particularly careful notes on the trade during the many years he spent 
in Java (1811-16), Singapore (1823-26), and on an important British 
mission to Siam and Vietnam (1821). Table 6 is based on the data in 
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Crawfurd's History of the Indian Archipelago (1820 III, 182-84), 
supplemented by the fuller data on Siam and Vietnam resulting from 
his 1821 mission (Crawfurd 1828, 410-12, 511-13). 
The largest vessels in Crawfurd' s survey were the three Amoy 
(Xiamen) junks sailing annually to Batavia, each of 1100 tons burden. In 
general all vessels making the long voyage to the Archipelago were of 
500 tons or more. By contrast the host of small vessels crowding the 
harbours of Vietnam were seldom more than 200 tons. Chinese junk-
captains told Crawfurd (1828, 512) that junks of 3000 pikuls (187 tons) 
were the largest which could navigate the Red River for the ports of 
Hanoi. The largest number of small vessels trading to Vietnamese and 
Siamese ports was in fact from Hainan (though classified here with 
Guangdong). Crawfurd noted that "seldom less than fifty" small 
vessels of between 125 and 210 tons burden visited Bangkok each year 
Table 6 
Junk Traffic of South China Sea, c.1820 
Siam Cuangdong Fujian Total 
No. tons No. tons No. Tons No. Tom 
24 3100 14 2000 3B 5100 
2B 4050 20 3750 48 7800 
22 3625 7 2875 29 6500 
81 24,560 56 10155 2 37S 139 35090 
1 500 2 1600 3 2100 
1 BOO 1 BOO 
1 800 1 BOO 
3 1500 3 1500 
2 1000 2 1000 
3 1500 3 1500 
2 1000 2 1000 
1 600 1 600 
4 2000 3 3300 7 5300 
2 1000 2 1000 
1 500 1 500 
2 1600 2 1600 
4-5 2000 4.5 2000 
24,560 146 29,030 59 20,600 286 74,190 
ne.were to remove from Crawford's estimates the ninety-six 
junks trading to Vietnam and Siam and the shipping based 
ok, the 109 junks from Fujian and Guangdong proper do not 
t a very large figure compared with Chinese listings for the 
.the 1740s. Crawfurd may have underestimated. His figures for 
w.er than those in the Dutch records (Table 3 above), and an 
.estimate (1795) had given the much larger figure of 100-
and 1000 small ones sailing southward from China every 
1975; 16-17). I believe, however, that Crawford was most 
been accurate in the same area covered by the licensed 
rlier Chinese figures - large ocean-going junks owned in 
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Fujian and Guangdong, and sailing with the blessing of the Chinese 
aut~orities there. It appears that these junks had grown bigger, 
particularly the richest ones from Amoy, but their number had not 
grown .n:iuch in the previous half-century. There was increasing 
compehhon for them from European-rigged ships, which could 
complete three voyages between Canton and Batavia per year in 
comparison with one for the junks, and with greater security according 
to Crawfurd (1820 III, 178). 
On the other hand there was a meteoric rise in Southeast Asia-
based Chinese shipping. Crawfurd had the opportunity for a careful 
study of the shipping of Bangkok in 1821, and recorded this neglected 
phenomenon there. The likelihood is, however, that there were 
numerous other junks based at Ha Tien, the lower Mekong and 
els<;where which escaped his notice, and which took some part in the 
Chma trade as well as along Southeast Asian routes. His own 
calculations showed that building a junk in Siam or southern Vietnam 
cost only half what it did in a Fujian port - fifteen-sixteen Spanish 
dollars per ton as opposed to thirty in Fujian and twenty in Canton 
(Crawfurd 1828, 49). Southeast Asian owners of Chinese junks therefore 
began with a considerable price advantage. 
In addition to the expansion of Bangkok-based shipping to China in 
the late eig~te:nth and early nineteenth centuries, there was a rapid 
gro"'.th role 1~ m.tr.a-:>ou theast Asian trade carried in Siamese junks. At 
the tin:ie of his v1s1t m. 1821,. c:awfurd considered about 200 Bangkok-
based junks were tradmg wrthm Southeast Asian waters, about fifty of 
them to Vietnam (principally Saigon), a similar number to the Malacca 
Straits ports, and the remainder chiefly to the east coast of the 
Malayan Peninsula, western Borneo, Palembang and Java. To some 
extent this trade was gathering Archipelago goods for the China 
market, but increasingly too it was collecting Indian and European 
cottons to provide Siam itself, in exchange for Siamese foodstuffs to 
feed the urban and immigrant communities of the region - rice, salt, 
sugar and oil. Crawfurd reckoned the average size of these junks to be 
140 tons, and the total tonnage of this regional shipping therefore about 
28,000 tons. Adding the China branch of the trade, he reckoned that 
11,500 seamen were engaged in Siam's total trade, most of them 
ethnically Chinese (Crawfurd 1828, 414-16). 
The transformation of Chinese shipping, 1819-1850 
The establishment of the British port of Singapore rapidly altered the 
~ompl~xion of Sino-Southeast Asian trade. Singapore almost 
immediately became the principal Straits port for junks to collect 
Western and Indian goods, and eventually also replaced Bangkok as a 
Southeast Asian entrepot for trade with China. Already in the official 
year 1829-30, sixty-six square-rigged vessels and twelve Chinese junks 
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cleared Singapore for China, figures which grew to 134 and eighteen in 
1835-6, and to 187 and ninety-seven in 1841-2 (Wong 1961, 276). 
The junks, which had tended to focus the trade of the Gulf of Siam 
in Bangkok at the beginning of the century, progressively made 
Singapore their major entrepot. In 1829-30 there arrived in Singapore 
thirty-one Siamese junks and forty-nine from Vietnam. The Saigon-
Singapore junk trade continued to grow rapidly, turning southern 
Vietnam's trade to Singapore rather than China. In 1847-8 162 junks 
arrived in the British port from Vietnam. In the Bangkok-Singapore 
trade there was a challenge from square-rigged ships, some of them 
owned by the Thai aristocracy, yet the advantageous tariffs enjoyed by 
junks kept their numbers growing right up until the Burney Treaty of 
1855. Eighty-five Siamese junks arrived in Singapore in 1853-4, against 
only thirty-seven European-rigged ships (ibid., 139-40, 278-79). 
Some Southeast Asia-based Chinese traders already employed 
square-rigged vessels, and occasionally also European captains, before 
the Nanjing Treaty of 1842. The process had begun in the seventeenth 
century for the inter-island trade. The opening of the Treaty ports of 
Canton, Shanghai, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Amoy to European shipping, 
however, removed the most powerful economic incentive to retain 
traditional ship styles. Gradually even Singapore Chinese began to use 
European-rigged vessels to ship their goods to China more quickly and 
cheaply. By 1865-66 the tonnage of junks on the Singapore-China routes 
was only 4,500, about one-hundredth of the capacity of square-rigged 
ships (ibid., 123). 
The Chinese entrepreneurs of Southeast Asia and southern China 
remained in the shipping business. They continued to play a major role 
in the shipping networks which linked Southeast Asia to Singapore, 
Canton, Hong Kong and Amoy. But the characteristic features which 
had made the Chinese junk trade a real alternative to Western-
dominated shipping networks gave way in the mid-nineteenth century. 
This shift was connected with the loss of effective independence of the 
remaining countries of Southeast Asia in the decade which followed. 
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PERAHU SHIPPING IN INDONESIA 1870-1914 
J.N.F.M. a Campo 
In the Indonesian archipelago perahu shipping was superseded but not 
eliminated by steam shipping. This paper explores the patterns of 
competition of steam and sail, with a special focus on the period 1870-
1914. It concludes by reviewing the policy of the Koninklijk 
Pakketvaart Maatschapij (KPM) in its dealings with sailing ships. 
Introduction 
The displacement of sailing vessels by steamships is a phenomenon 
which at first appearances encompassed the entire world with a 
seeming inevitability. The famous Dutch poet Slauerhoff, medical 
doctor on the Dutch Java-China-Japan Line, in his "Praise of Steam 
Shipping," described sailing vessels as "shades from an old, oft told 
and now bygone tale" (Slauerhoff 1988, 593). But given the extent to 
which sailing ships are still used to this very day in the Indonesian 
archipelago, this certainly was premature (Dick 1975; 1987). Much less 
was it a foregone conclusion in the course of the nineteenth century that 
wind would be replaced by steam as a source of energy. As late as 1880 
brochures were being published in which Dutch business interests were 
actually called upon to deploy special new (iron) sailing vessels in 
order to safeguard the shrinking Dutch share of world freight 
shipping.1 
The superseding of one technology by another is not a natural or 
.mechanical phenomenon but rather a social process. Substitution is 
seldom complete, and from a contemporary point of view it is not often 
~asy to indicate exactly where a new equilibrium will arise between 
tlle.old and new technologies. The relationship is not only determined 
!?ythe nature of both technologies, but can also easily be influenced by 
omic developments (patterns of demand, cost structures) and by 
nges in the social esteem given to both technologies. 
Zeverijn 1881, 38-41; "Oedipus" (pseudonym) 1881, 19-21. This should not be 
:~en as just. a ~ymptom of the industrial retardation of Dutch shipbuilding. Even 
)n ,Great Bnta1n there were proponents of iron or steel-hulled sailing ships 
,(Ha;ley 197!, 226). In Great Britain, the ups and downs in the building of sail 
steamship tonnage between 1835 till 1870 paralleled one another; after that 
~ese. movements were contrary (see MacGregor 1984, 17). So this 
~cus~1oi: m the early eighties may have been prompted by the crisis in the 
tpbu!ldmg industry. 
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